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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TIME COMMERCIAL FINANCING CORP.,
a Utah. corporation,
Plaintiff~Appellant,

vs,

CAROL BRIMHALL, WILLIAM HESTERMAN,
STEPHEN D. SCHULTZ and BRIMHALL
PRODUCT~, INC., a corporation, and
4-.SPECTRA, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
Administrator with. tfl.e Will annexed
of the Estate of Ray s. Brimli.all,
deceased,

Case )fa

Defendant-Respondent
and Th.ird-.party Plaintiff,
vs.

BRIMCO HYDRAULICS &ENGINEERIN~ 1 INC.,
a corporation, JOHN B. FAIRBAN~fuJR.,
and WESTERN RESEARCH AND MANUFAC RING
COMPANY,
Th.ird•Party Defendants-.
Respondents,

RESPONSE. TO APPELLANT•S RHPL'Y' BJ:fE'P

BY' DRFENDA;NtS-.RESPONDENTS CAROL

BR!MHALL DAVIS ANlJ

wxx:m mr
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APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DATED APRIL 11, 1977,
BY THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, DISTRICT JUDGE.

Thous J. Rossa
David v. Trask
Trask & Britt
345 South State Street, Suite 105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1922
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents Carol Brimhall
Davis, Walker Bank &Trust
Company and Brimhall Product~, Inc.

Philip A. Mallinckrodt
Robert R. Mallinckrodt
Mallinckrodt &Mallinckrodt
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-1624
A. Wally Sandack
Sandack & Sandack
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0555
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
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RESPONSE REQUIRED
The defendants-respondents Carol Brimhall Davis (hereinafter "Davis") and Walker Bank & Trust Company, Administrator
with the Will annexed of the Estate of Ray S, Brimhall, deceased
(hereinafter "Walker Bank"), respectfully submit this response
to Appellant's Reply Brief.

A response to that brief is regarded

as necessary in view of improper, unsupportable and misdirected
argument therein presented and in view of a recent trial court
pronouncement which bears directly on the issues before this
Court in this appeal,
THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
This appeal arises from a post-judgment proceeding
in which the trial court held that a particular product (a "Black
Cab Latch") is a royalty bearing product (R-754) under and pursuant to the final Amended Decree of July 30, 1975 (R-624),
The plaintiff-appellant Time Commercial Financing Corporation
(hereinafter "TIMECO") claims that it was denied due process
in the proceedings immediately precedent to that holding.

In

turn TIMECO seeks reversal of that holding and a "remand to the
lower court to consider additional evidence" (TIMECO's Brief,
page 2).

The defendants-respondents Davis and Walker Bank urge

that the appeal is not perfected and that TIMECO was not denied
due process.
THE APPEAL IS HOT PERFECTED
The defendants-respondents Davis and Walker Bank assert

-1-
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that the appeal is not perfected on several 3rounds as set
in their Brief.

TIMECO disagrees by asserting distinction,

without substance.
Notice of Appeal
Fatally Defective
In their main Brief (page 7), Davis and Walker Bani.
argue that the Notice of Appeal is fatally defective because
it takes appeal from the trial court Order of April 11, ig-(R~798)

which denied TIMECO's Motion For Review And ll'ithdra·o1a

Of Memorandum Decision of January 31, 1977 (R-755) rather thi·'
from the substantive trial court decision of January 2-l, ig··
(R-754) of which TIMECO complains.
TIMECO challenges the position of Davis and Walker
Bank on the grounds that TIMECO's motion of January 31,

19~"

(R-755) was not a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 as Da'..
and Walker Bank argue,

Rather, TIMECO asserts that its moti:·

of January 31, 1977 was "in substance and effect .... ,a motior.
I

to alter or amend the Judgment of January 24, 1977, as proricil

I

for by Rule 59(e).,." (Reply Brief, page 4),
is without material difference,
of Appeal any less defective,

The distinctior

It does not make the Notice
A motion to alter or amend a

judgment is also not appealable.

Th.e case of Walker v. Banh

of America National Trust & Savings Association, 268 F,2cl l'.
!

(CCA 9th., 1959), cert, den., 361 U.S. 903, 80 S.Ct. 211, .\ l,
2d 158 (1959) so holds except w!Lere the order denving the i::

-2-
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I

is challenged as a manifest abuse of discretion,

However, TIMECO

has not here presented such a challenge,
Appeal Untimely
Defendants-respondents Davis and Walker Bank argue
that the appeal presented hy TIMECO is not timely on the basis
that the Motion For Review And Withdrawal Of Memorandum Decision
filed by TIMECO on January 31, 19 77 (R-755) was not a motion
for a new trial under Rule 59.

In its Reply Brief at page 7,

TIMECO responds by characterizing the January 31, 1977 motion
as a motion to alter or amend a judgment (i,e., the Order of
January 24, 1977).

The distinction is meaningless.

Davis and Walker Bank assert that TIMECO's motion of
January 31, 1977 was a motion for reconsideration prohibited
under the doctrine expressed by this Court in Drury v. Lunceford,
18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966),

In the post-trial and

post-judgment environment of the instant case, the purpose of
a motion of the kind submitted by TIMECO could only be to seek
reconsideration,
completed in 1972.

No new trial could be had since the trial was
No alteration of a judgment could be made

because the judgment at issue is the Amended Decree of July 30,
1975 (R-624) which was

clearly~

judicata.

The memorandum

decision or Minute Order of January 24, 1977 (_R-755} by which
the trial court reasserted the meaning of the July 30, 1975
Judgment was being challenged by TIMECO.

A motion for a new

trial or to alter or amend under Rule 59 was not then claimed
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and does not col'lport with the factual and procedural enn
ment.
r~oL

Nevertheless, TD!ECO aggressively asserts the
of January 31, 19 77 was under Rule 59 (e).

Such an asscrtio::

is without foundation for reasons as set forth on pages 11-L
of the Brief of Davis and Walker Bank and for the reason tha:
the motion did not seek to alter or amend anything,

:io errc:

either legal, grammatical or otherwise was claimed to exist:·
any judgment or order.

Rather, TIMECO's motion of Januarv : ..

1977, if anything, sought reconsideration on the basis that:
trial court should take additional evidence.

t~.:

Accordingly,

'.

i
to: I

January 31, 1977 motion could not have been under Rule 59(eJ
in substance or in effect.

Therefore, the motion did not

the appeal period; and the appeal is untimely.
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS
The "Black Cab Latch", which is the centerpoint o:
dispute, is not a new product.

.

THIECO didn't start ma k mg

or selling it last week or even last year.

!I

.I

1.

It was being maJr

and sold long before the Amended Decree of July 30, 19 75 (R·:.
was entered.

The trial court knew of the existence of the'':.

Cab Latch" by testimony presented as early as June 12, 19"'
(R-217).

Indeed, much testimony is of record presenting

~~~·

/

and details pertinent to the "Black Cab Latch" (R-2:ci, R-.:-. I1
R-220),

Accordingly, the trial court was quite familiar

the accused product when it was brought before the court
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:

I

December 22, 1977.

The court was there asked to decide whether

or not the "Black Cab Latch" was intended to be within or without
the scope of its Arnendeu Decree of July 30, 1975.

It certainly

could decide that question without any evidence because the trial
court was in effect and in fact simply reasserting and restating
the scope and intent of its Amended Decree of July 30, 1975,
At a recent hearing in the trial court before the Honorable James
S. Sawaya, the trial court said with respect to the question
of TIMECO's liability for royalties on the "Black Cab Latch"
and the findings now on appeal to this Court:
"I have found as a matter of fact, a matter that
I submit is subject to review of the Supreme Court
because you (_TIMECO) have made that on issue on appeal,
that the black cab latch is sufficientlr identical
with the original cab latch that royalties should
be paid on it, .••.• L said you have got a license by
reason of succession because you (_TI~ffiCO) foreclosed
and nobody really took issue with my findings on that.
You (TI~ffiCO) paid royalties until you (TI~ffiCO) started
manufacturing a cab latch that was in my mind sufficiently identical that you (TIMECO) should be paying
royalties on that as well pursuant to the Court's
Order. t found that and frankly I think it was an
atteni t to change the thing in some minute minor
etail so t at you
1E 0 wou n t ave to pay royalties and I don't think that that's---I don't think
that's fair quite frankly,. •. " Extracted from transcript of proceedings before the Hon~rable James s.
Sawaya on September 23, 1977 (emphasis added),
Based on the above statement, it can be seen that the
trial court was familiar with the "Black Cab Latch" and properly
ruled that it was a royalty bearing product within the scope
of its Amended Decree of July 30, 1975.

No due process violation

is extant"
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IMPROPER ARGUJ,!ENT

In its Reply Brief, TIMECO presents argument whic:.
is improper, unsupportable or misdirected"

Brief response t':.

is made below.
Nordell-Kimball Patent
Not of Record
On page 10, at line 11 of its Reply Brief, TH!ECO
admits that it withdrew the Nordell-Kimball patent from the
record.

In other words, that patent is not of record an<l i;

not evidence.

Accordingly, any and all argument by TIMECO ba:,

on th.at patent is improper, unsupportable and misdirected,
should not be considered by this Court because it is

I:

based~

evidence not of record"
Resistance to Royalty Payments
TIMECO accuses Davis and Walker Bank of making var;:
misleading statements to the effect that TIMECO has dernonsw:
a position of resisting royalty payments"
1, lines 1-10"

Reply Brief, page

On page 2, lines 1 and 2, of its Reply Brief,

TUIECO flatly admits th.at i t resisted royalty payments.

Tl\E

accusation is th.us groundless.
Th.e December 22, 1976
Hearing
TIMECO now maintains th.at it ob.jected to continua;.:
of any proceedings after th..e court reporter departed.

Indee;

TIMECO asserts th.at the statement of Davis and Walker Bank t:
th.e contrary is "false".

The transcript of those proceedir<
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--shows no objection being voiced by
(R-726) shows no such objection.
such objection (R-726-754),

TI~ffiCO.

The minute entry

The record is devoid of any

Any such objection was not presented

in TIME CO' s Motion For Review And Withdrawal of January 31, 19 77
(R-755).
objection,

Counsel for Davis and Walker Bank recall no such
In other words, TIMECO asserts the existence of

such an objection without any foundation therefore in the record,
Accordingly, it should be disregarded by this Court,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons as set forth in the Brief of the
Defendants-respondents Davis and Walker Bank of August 19, 1977
and for the additional reasons as herein set forth, this Court
is urged to dismiss this Appeal or in the alternative to affirm
the trial court,
Respectfully submitted,

- 7-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Th.is is to certify that true and correct copies of
the foregoing RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF BY DEFC:;D:\.\T~.
RESPONDENTS CAROL BRIMHALL DAVIS AND WALKER BAN'K were hand delivered on the
(a)

;1~~ay

of Novemher, 1977, as follows:

Two copies to Philip A, Mallinckrodt, ~lallinckro

& Mallinckrodt, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, 8Hll:
(b)

Two copies to A, Wally Sanda ck, Sandack & Sanda·

370 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111;
(c)

Original and nine copies to the Clerk of The

Supreme Court of the State of
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